

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BONN 01136 01 OF 02 231214Z

13

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W

----- 008032

R 231158Z JAN 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7430

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

CINCEUR VAIHINGEN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 01136

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, GW

SUBJECT: MBFR: VERIFICATION THE FRG

REF: USNATO 7075

BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CURRENT FRG POSITION ON VERIFICATION DOES NOT DEVIATE MUCH FROM PAST CONSERVATIVE VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT. THE GERMANS EMPHASIZE THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF A VERIFICATION SYSTEM RATHER THAN ITS TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY. THE GERMANS BELIEVE THAT A SYSTEM ENCOMPASSING PRE-NOTIFICATION OF TROOP MOVEMENTS WITH FIXED EXIT/ENTRY POSTS WOULD SATISFY MOST VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. THE GERMANS PROFESS TO SEE SUPPORT DEVELOPING IN BRUSSELS FOR THEIR POSITION, AND THEY ARE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY FOR ITS ACCEPTANCE BY THE ALLIES. THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT, GIVEN FRG POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES ON THE TOPIC,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 01136 01 OF 02 231214Z

WASHINGTON SHOULD RECONSIDER THE REQUIREMENT FOR

MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS. END SUMMARY

1. U.S. MISSION NATO REQUESTED EMBASSY VIEWS ON THE VERIFICATION QUESTION AS VIEWED FROM BONN. (REFTEL, PARA 9) WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION BASED UPON RECENT AND PAST DISCUSSIONS WITH RESPONSIBLE GERMAN OFFICIALS.

2. THE CURRENT FRG POSITION ON VERIFICATION DOES NOT DEVIATE MUCH FROM THE BASICALLY HARD LINE TAKEN THUS FAR BY THE GERMANS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THE GERMANS STRESS THAT THEIR INTEREST IN A VERIFICATION SYSTEM IS WEIGHED MORE HEAVILY TOWARD POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY THAN TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY. FRG OFFICIALS HAVE CONTINUED STRONGLY TO OPPOSE THE CONCEPT OF PERMANENT MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS, AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE AS WELL AS ON THE PRACTICAL GROUND THAT AGREEMENT BY THE FRG TO SUCH A SCHEME WOULD LEND ITSELF TO DOMESTIC POLITICAL EXPLOITATION BY THE OPPOSITION CDU/CSU. THE GERMANS WANT TO AVOID ESTABLISHING THE FRG AS A "SPECIAL ZONE" IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHETHER FOR REDUCTIONS OR INSPECTION. THUS, THE GERMANS HOPE TO OBTAIN CBM'S IN THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL EUROPEAN STATES AND NOT FOCUSING PRINCIPALLY ON THE FRG. BESIDES THE ARGUMENT ABOUT INFRINGEMENT ON GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY, THE GERMANS ALWAYS POINT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND THE NEED TO PREEMPT THE SOVIETS FROM EXERCISING INFLUENCE OVER SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. IN EFFECT, THE FRG PLACES A HIGHER VALUE ON LIMITING SOVIET INTRUSION, IN THE FRG AS WELL AS WESTERN EUROPE, THAN ON FINDING MEASURES TO AUGMENT NTM.

3. ANOTHER KEY GERMAN ARGUMENT IS THAT ANY VERIFICATION SYSTEM MUST BE BASED ON THE REALITIES OF THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT. THE GERMANS ARGUE THAT THE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR PHASE I WILL PROBABLY BE QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE NECESSARY TO OVERSEE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A PHASE II AGREEMENT. THUS, THE GERMANS ARE MOST RELUCTANT TO AGREE TO A COMPREHENSIVE VERIFICATION REGIME PRIOR TO KNOWING THE SCOPE OF PHASE I

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BONN 01136 01 OF 02 231214Z

REDUCTIONS. SINCE WESTERN NEGOTIATING GOALS HAVE BEEN TO OBTAIN SMALLER-SCALE REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I, THE GERMANS HAVE TRIED TO DESIGN A VERIFICATION SYSTEM TO MEET THE EXPECTED REQUIREMENTS. THUS, THEY FORMULATED A SYSTEM BASED ON FIXED EXIT/ENTRY POINTS WHICH WOULD BE PLACED IN STRATEGIC LOCATIONS TO MONITOR WITHDRAWALS FROM THE NGA AND PROVIDE AT LEAST SOME MEANS TO CHECK ON THE REINTRODUCTION OF FORCES INTO THE AREA. AN

ADDITIONAL RECENT ELEMENT IN THE GERMAN SCHEME HAS BEEN THAT OF PRE-NOTIFICATION. WHEN PRE-NOTIFICATION IS COUPLED WITH A SYSTEM OF FIXED POSTS, THE GERMANS FEEL STRONGLY THAT A SYSTEM OF SUFFICIENT TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY COULD BE ESTABLISHED WHICH WOULD SATISFY MOST REQUIREMENTS. THEY EMPHASIZE THAT ANY TROOP MOVEMENT INTO THE NGA WHICH HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY REPORTED AHEAD OF TIME WOULD IP SO FACTO CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 BONN 01136 02 OF 02 231210Z

13

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W

----- 008007

R 231158Z JAN 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7431

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

CINCEUR VAIHINGEN

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 01136

4. THE GERMANS PROFESS TO SEE ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THEIR POSITION DEVELOPING IN BRUSSELS. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY PLEASED THAT THE U.S. HAS BEEN OFFERING MORE SUPPORT RECENTLY. WHEREAS A FEW MONTHS AGO THE

GERMANS FELT ISOLATED ON THE VERIFICATION ISSUE, THEY BELIEVE THE POINTS THEY HAVE BEEN MAKING IN BRUSSELS ARE NOW BEGINNING TO HAVE AN EFFECT. THUS, THE GERMANS APPROACH THE UPCOMING VERIFICATION DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WITH A SENSE OF OPTIMISM THAT THEIR POSITION IS A SOUND ONE BASED UPOH NEGOTIATING AND POLITICAL REALITIES WHICH MERITS THE SUPPORT OF THE ALLIES.

5. COMMENT: AS WE KNOW, THE CONCEPT OF PERMANENT MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS IS A POLITICAL BETE NOIRE WITH
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 01136 02 OF 02 231210Z

THE GERMANS GIVEN THE INTERNAL RAMIFICATIONS WHICH WOULD BE CAUSED BY FRG AGREEMENT TO SUCH A SYSTEM - IF INDEED THEY COULD EVER AGREE TO IT. MOREOVER, AS ILLUSTRATED BY ACDA FIELD STUDY NO. 15, THE QUESTION REMAINS HOW EFFECTIVE SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD BE IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, THE TEAMS WERE HINDERED WHILE CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS IN EASTERN COUNTRIES. SINCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS CANNOT BE PROVEN AND IN VIEW OF THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY WITH THE SOVIETS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, WE BELIEVE THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF DROPPING THE REQUIREMENT FOR MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT FRG POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES. END COMMENT
HILLENBRAND

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, NEGOTIATIONS, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 JAN 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975BONN01136
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750025-0734
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750128/aaaaaydr.tel
Line Count: 200
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 75 USNATO 7075
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <02 APR 2003 by MartinML>; APPROVED <03 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: VERIFICATION THE FRG
TAGS: PARM, GE, NATO, CSCE, MBFR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006